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“[W]ithout a corresponding change in discovery culture by
courts, counsel and clients alike, the proposed rules
modifications will likely have little to no effect on the
manner in which discovery is conducted today.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
[1]
It has been over seven years now since the so-called e-Discovery
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Federal Rules,”

*

Senior Discovery Counsel, Recommind, Inc.; J.D., Santa Clara University School of
Law, 1999; B.A., Political Science, Brigham Young University, 1994.

1

Mitchell Dembin & Philip Favro, Changing Discovery Culture One Step at a Time,
LAW TECH. NEWS (Dec. 5, 2013),
http://www.lawtechnologynews.com/id=1202630168239/Changing-Discovery-CultureOne-Step-at-a-Time?slreturn=20140126202727 (describing the steps organizations can
take to satisfy the provisions set forth in the newly proposed amendments to the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure).
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“Rules,” or individually, “Rule”) went into effect.2 When they were
implemented, various commentators reasoned those amendments would
facilitate a more efficient and cost-effective resolution of discovery
issues.3 This, in turn, would free parties to focus on the merits of claims
and defenses, “teeing matters up for disposition through settlement,
summary judgment, or trial.”4 The reality, of course, is far from this
Pollyannaish vision. Instead of simplifying the process, the 2006
amendments seem to have generated more satellite litigation than ever
before about preservation and production issues.5
2

See U.S. Supreme Court Order Amending the Fed. R. Civ. P. at 3, Apr. 12, 2006,
available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/frcv06p.pdf; see also Philip
J. Favro, A New Frontier in Electronic Discovery: Preserving and Obtaining Metadata,
13 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 1, 18 n.114 (2007).

3

See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, SUMMARY
OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE 24 (Sep. 2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf; see
also Jessica DeBono, Comment, Preventing and Reducing Costs and Burdens Associated
with E-discovery: The 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 59
MERCER L. REV. 963, 964 (2008) (explaining that “the 2006 amendments are intended to
help reduce the costs and burdens imposed by electronic discovery”).
4

Philip J. Favro & Hon. Derek P. Pullan, New Utah Rule 26: A Blueprint for
Proportionality under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 2012 MICH. ST. L. REV. 933,
979 (2012); see also Milberg LLP & Hausfeld LLP, E-Discovery Today: The Fault Lies
Not in Our Rules . . ., 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 131, 142 (2011) (arguing that the 2006 Rules
amendments “place a premium on a fair resolution on the merits” and deter lawyers from
using discovery “as an opportunity to hide the ball until trial”).
5

See Philip Favro & Tish Looper, The Rule 37(e) Safe Harbor: The Touchstone of
Effective Information Management, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., December 2011, at
12; Dan H. Willoughby, Jr. et al., Sanctions for E-Discovery Violations: By the
Numbers, 60 DUKE L.J. 789, 792-95 (2010) (observing that the “highest number of filed
motions and awards relating to e-[D]iscovery sanctions in any single year prior to 2010
occurred in 2009, three years after the effective date of the 2006 amendments”).
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[2]
Beyond the issues spawned by the 2006 amendments, the costs and
complexity of discovery are increasing due to digital age advances that
have caused information to proliferate exponentially.6 For example,
mobile devices such as smartphones and tablet computers have provided
users with new methods that facilitate a more rapid and user-friendly
exchange of information.7 Users now share that information with
increasing frequency through short message service and social networks.8
Because users do so in far greater quantities than they did with e-mail, the
number of communications potentially subject to discovery has been
substantially augmented.9 Moreover, users have an unlimited virtual

6

See COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE U.S., 113TH CONG., PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE
FEDERAL RULES OF BANKRUPTCY AND CIVIL PROCEDURE 271 (Comm. Print 2013),
available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/rules/preliminary-draft-proposedamendments.pdf [hereinafter REPORT] (observing that “[t]he amount and variety of
digital information has expanded enormously in the last decade, and the costs and
burdens of litigation holds have escalated as well”).
7

See generally Tom Kaneshige, Infographic: BYOD’s Meteoric Rise, CIO (Jan. 16, 2013,
2:50 PM), http://blogs.cio.com/consumer-it/17707/infographic-byods-meteoric-rise
(noting the substantial growth of personal mobile device use in the workplace).
8

See Gabriella Khorasanee, The Growing Reach of e-Discovery: Text Messages, INHOUSE (Oct. 14, 2013, 11:52 AM), http://blogs.findlaw.com/in_house/2013/10/thegrowing-reach-of-e-discovery-text-messages.html (discussing survey results regarding
cellphone use for text messaging, along with associated e-Discovery risks arising from
text messaging).
9

Cf. William D. Henderson, A Blueprint for Change, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 461, 487 (2013)
(observing that discovery burdens have increased due to the “massive explosion of digital
data,” which includes “e[-]mails, text messages, internal knowledge management
platforms designed to replace e[-]mail, and digitized voice mail”).
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warehouse in which to store those conversations due to the popularity of
low cost cloud computing services.10
[3]
Given these factors and the challenges they present to the
discovery process, there should be little doubt as to why the Judicial
Conference Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules (“Committee”) has
proposed another round of Rules amendments.11 The draft amendments
are generally designed to streamline the federal discovery process,
encourage cooperative advocacy among litigants, and eliminate
gamesmanship.12 The proposed changes also tackle the continuing
problems associated with the preservation of electronically stored
information (“ESI”).13 As a result of its efforts, the Committee has
produced a package of amendments that could affect many aspects of
federal discovery practice.14

10

See generally William Jeremy Robison, Note, Free at What Cost?: Cloud Computing
Privacy Under the Stored Communications Act, 98 GEO. L.J. 1195, 1200 n.26, 1202-04
(2010) (defining cloud computing and describing its rapidly expanding usage).
11

See generally Craig B. Shaffer & Ryan T. Shaffer, Looking Past The Debate: Proposed
Revisions to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 7 FED. CTS. L. REV. 178, 187-90
(2013) (describing generally the factors driving the demand for additional amendments to
the Federal Rules); REPORT, supra note 6, at 259-339.
12

See REPORT, supra note 6, at 1, 260, 270.

13

See id. at 272, 274.

14

See Shaffer & Shaffer, supra note 11, at 178-79. See generally REPORT, supra note 6,
at 259-339.
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[4]
To date, most of the debate on the proposals has focused on the
draft amendment to Rule 37(e).15 That amendment would raise the
standard of culpability required to impose sanctions for any failure to
preserve relevant information.16 Such attention is understandable given
the proposal’s likely impact on organizations’ defensible deletion efforts.17
Nevertheless, there are several other noteworthy changes that are no less
important for litigants and lawyers.18 Among these are the amendments
that would usher in a new era of adversarial cooperation, proportionality
standards, and active judicial case management.19 The collective impact
of these proposals could result in decreased burdens and costs for courts,
clients, and counsel alike.20
15

See, e.g., Thomas Y. Allman, Rules Committee Adopts ‘Package’ of Discovery
Amendments, 13 DIGITAL DISCOVERY AND E-EVIDENCE 200 (2013),
http://www.bloomberglaw.com/document/X4ST0CC4000000
16

See REPORT, supra note 6, at 272 (“[T]he amended rule [37(e)] makes it clear that—in
all but very exceptional cases in which failure to preserve ‘irreparably deprived a party of
any meaningful opportunity to present or defend against the claims in the litigation’—
sanctions (as opposed to curative measures) could be employed only if the court finds
that the failure to preserve was willful or in bad faith, and that it caused substantial
prejudice in the litigation.” (quoting the proposed Rule 37(e)(1)(B)(ii))).
17

See Michael Kozubek, Proposed Federal Rule Changes Would Limit the Scope of ediscovery, INSIDE COUNSEL (July 1, 2013),
http://www.insidecounsel.com/2013/07/01/proposed-federal-rule-changes-would-limitthe-scop.
18

See REPORT, supra note 6, at 260.

19

See id.

20

See Alison Frankel, Debate Sharpens on Proposed Changes to Federal Rules on
Discovery, REUTERS (Nov. 6, 2013), http://blogs.reuters.com/alisonfrankel/2013/11/06/debate-sharpens-on-proposed-changes-to-federal-rules-on-discovery/.
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[5]
For organizations to meet the challenges these proposed changes
pose, they will need to take actionable measures to satisfy those
provisions.21 Such measures generally fall under the umbrella of an
enterprise’s information governance plan.22
For many companies,
information governance remains an elusive concept.23 Nevertheless, an
intelligent information governance plan offers a more enlightened
approach for companies to comply with the proposed Rules changes.24
Moreover, it is perhaps the only way for clients to realistically reduce the
costs and burdens of discovery.25
[6]
In this Article, I will consider these subjects. In Part II, I provide
an overview of the newly proposed amendments and discuss the impact
the Rules proposals will likely have on organizations. In Part III, I offer
five practical suggestions that, if followed, will help enterprises meet the
information governance challenges posed by the proposed Rules
amendments.
II. THE NEWLY PROPOSED AMENDMENTS
[7]
The overall thrust of the Committee’s proposed amendments is to
facilitate the tripartite aims of Federal Rule 1 in the discovery process.26
21

Cf. Hon. Patrick J. Walsh, Rethinking Civil Litigation in Federal District Court, 40
LITIG. 6, 7 (2013) (urging lawyers to use “[twenty-first] century computer technology” to
address digital age discovery issues instead of relying on legacy discovery technologies).
22

See Dembin & Favro, supra note 1.

23

See id.

24

See id.

25

See id.

26

See REPORT, supra note 6, at 260-61, 264, 269-70.
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To carry out Rule 1’s lofty yet important mandate of securing “the just,
speedy, and inexpensive determination” of litigation,27 the Committee has
proposed several modifications to advance the notions of cooperation and
proportionality.28 Other changes focus on improving “early and effective
judicial case management.”29 In addition, the Committee has proposed
revising Federal Rule 37(e) in an attempt to create a uniform national
standard for discovery sanctions stemming from failures to preserve
evidence.30 The draft amendments that address these concepts are each
considered in turn. I will then conclude this Part by generally discussing
the effects the Rules changes will likely have on organizations.
A. Cooperation—Rule 1
[8]
To better emphasize the need for adversarial cooperation in
discovery, the Committee has recommended that Rule 1 be amended to
specify that clients share the responsibility with the court for achieving the
Rule’s objectives.31 The proposed revisions to the Rule (in italics with
deletions in strikethrough) read in pertinent part as follows: “[These rules]
should be construed, and administered, and employed by the court and the
27

FED. R. CIV. P. 1.

28

See REPORT, supra note 6, at 260-61, 264, 269-70 (observing that “[p]roportionality in
discovery, cooperation among lawyers, and early and active judicial case management
are highly valued and, at times, missing in action,” and discussing how the proposed
amendments would advance these notions).
29

Id. at 260.

30

See id. at 272 (“A central objective of the proposed new Rule 37(e) is to replace the
disparate treatment of preservation/sanctions issues in different circuits by adopting a
single standard.”).

31

See id. at 270.
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parties to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.”32
[9]
Even though this concept was already set forth in the Advisory
Committee Notes to Rule 1, the Committee felt that an express reference
in the Rule itself would prompt litigants and their lawyers to engage in
more cooperative conduct.33 Perhaps more importantly, this mandate
should also enable judges “to elicit better cooperation when the lawyers
and parties fall short.”34 Indeed, such a reference, when coupled with the
“stop and think” certification requirement from Federal Rule 26(g), should
give jurists more than enough procedural basis to remind counsel and
clients of their duty to conduct discovery in a cooperative and cost
effective manner.35
B. Proportionality—Rules 26, 30, 31, 33, 34, 36
[10] The logical corollary to cooperation in discovery is
proportionality.36 Proportionality standards, which require that the
32

Id. at 281.

33

See REPORT, supra note 6, at 270, 281.

34

Id. at 270.

35

See Bottoms v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Bos., No. 11-cv-01606-PAB-CBS, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 143251, at *10-11 (D. Colo. Dec. 13, 2011) (spotlighting the
importance of the Rule 26(g) certification requirement, along with sanctions for
noncompliance, for curbing discovery abuses).
36

See, e.g., Pippins v. KPMG LLP, No. 11 Civ. 0377(CM)(JLC), 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
116427, at *23-27 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011), aff’d, 279 F.R.D. 245 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
(discussing generally why cooperation and proportionality are inextricably intertwined
for purposes of discovery).

8

Richmond Journal of Law & Technology

Volume XX, Issue 2

benefits of discovery be commensurate with its burdens, have been extant
in the Federal Rules since 1983.37 Nevertheless, they have been invoked
too infrequently over the past thirty years to address the problems of overdiscovery and gamesmanship that permeate the discovery process.38 In an
effort to spotlight this “highly valued” yet “missing in action” doctrine,39
the Committee has proposed numerous changes to the current Rules
regime.40 The most significant changes are found in Rules 26(b)(1) and
34(b).41
1. Rule 26(b)(1)—Tightening the Scope of Permissible
Discovery
[11] The Committee has proposed that the permissible scope of
discovery under Rule 26(b)(1) be modified to spotlight the limitations
proportionality imposes on discovery.42 Those limitations are presently
found in Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and are not readily apparent to many lawyers or
judges.43 Rule 26(b)(2)(C) provides that discovery must be limited where
requests are unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, the discovery can be
37

See REPORT, supra note 6, at 264-65.

38

Cf. Favro & Pullan, supra note 4, at 966-968 (proposing modest changes to the Federal
Rules to better emphasize that proportionality standards are the touchstone of federal
discovery).

39

REPORT, supra note 6, at 260.

40

See id. at 264-67, 269.

41

See id. at 264-67.

42

See id. at 265, 296.

43

See id. at 296; Favro & Pullan, supra note 4, at 966.
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obtained from an alternative source that is less expensive or burdensome,
or the burden or expense of the discovery outweighs its benefit.44 The
proposed modification (in italics) would address this problem by placing
them in Rule 26(b)(1) and by more clearly conditioning the permissible
scope of discovery on proportionality standards:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and
proportional to the needs of the case, considering the
amount in controversy, the importance of the issues at stake
in the action, the parties’ resources, the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues, and whether the burden
or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely
benefit.45
By moving the proportionality rule directly into the scope of discovery,
counsel and the courts may gain a better understanding of the restraints
this concept places on discovery.46
[12] Rule 26(b)(1) has additionally been modified to enforce the notion
that discovery is confined to those matters that are relevant to the claims
or defenses at issue in a particular case.47 Even though discovery has been
limited in this regard for many years, the Committee felt this limitation
was being swallowed by the “reasonably calculated” provision in Rule

44

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C).

45

REPORT, supra note 6, at 289.

46

See Favro & Pullan, supra note 4, at 966, 976.

47

See REPORT, supra note 6, at 296-97.
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26(b)(1).48 That provision currently provides for the discovery of relevant
evidence that is inadmissible so long as it is “reasonably calculated to lead
to the discovery of admissible evidence.”49 Despite the narrow purpose of
this provision, the Committee found many judges and lawyers unwittingly
extrapolated the “reasonably calculated” wording to broaden discovery
beyond the benchmark of relevance.50 To disabuse courts and counsel of
this practice, the “reasonably calculated” phrase has been removed and
replaced with the following sentence: “Information within this scope of
discovery need not be admissible in evidence to be discoverable.”51
[13] Similarly, the Committee has recommended eliminating the
provision in Rule 26(b)(1) which presently allows the court—on a
showing of good cause—to order “discovery of any matter relevant to the
subject matter involved in the action.”52 In its proposed “Committee
Note,” the Committee justified this excision by reiterating its mantra about
the proper scope of discovery: “Proportional discovery relevant to any
party’s claim or defense suffices.”53

48

Id. at 266.

49

FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1).

50

See REPORT, supra note 6, at 266.

51

Id. at 289-90.

52

Id. at 265-66, 296-97.

53

Id. at 296-297.
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2.
Rule 34(b)—Eliminating Gamesmanship with
Document Productions
[14] The three key modifications the Committee has proposed for Rule
34 are designed to eliminate some of the gamesmanship associated with
written discovery responses.54 The first change is a requirement in Rule
34(b)(2)(B) that any objection made in response to a document request
must be stated “with specificity.”55 This recommended change is
supposed to do away with the assertion of general objections.56 While
such objections have almost universally been rejected in federal discovery
practice, they still appear in Rule 34 responses.57 By including an explicit
requirement for specific objections and coupling it with the threat of
sanctions for non-compliance under Rule 26(g), the Committee may
finally eradicate this practice from discovery.58
[15] The second change is calculated to address another longstanding
discovery dodge: making a party’s response “subject to” a particular set of
objections.59 Whether those objections are specific or general, the
Committee concluded that such a conditional response leaves the party
who requested the materials unsure as to whether anything was withheld
and, if so, on what grounds.60 To remedy this practice, the Committee
54

See id. at 269.

55

REPORT, supra note 6, at 269, 307-08.

56

See id. at 308.

57

See, e.g., Mancia v. Mayflower Textile Servs. Co., 253 F.R.D. 354, 359 (D. Md. 2008).

58

See FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g)(3).

59

See REPORT, supra note 6, at 269.

60

See id. at 269, 309.
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added the following provision to Rule 34(b)(2)(C): “An objection must
state whether any responsive materials are being withheld on the basis of
that objection.”61 If enforced, such a requirement could make Rule 34
responses more straightforward and less evasive.62 This, in turn, would
obviate needless meet-and-confer efforts and motion practice undertaken
to ferret out such information.63
[16] The third change is intended to clarify the uncertainty surrounding
the responding party’s timeframe for producing documents.64 As it now
stands, Rule 34 does not expressly mandate when the responding party
must complete its production of documents.65 That omission has led to
delayed and open-ended productions, which can lengthen the discovery
process and increase litigation expenses.66 To correct this oversight, the
Committee proposed that the responding party complete its production “no
later than the time for inspection stated in the request or [at] a later
reasonable time stated in the response.”67 For so-called “rolling
productions,” the responding party “should specify the beginning and end
dates of the production.”68 Such a provision should ultimately provide
61

Id. at 308.

62

See id. at 269, 309.

63

See id.

64

See REPORT, supra note 6 at 269.

65

See id.

66

See id.

67

Id. at 269, 307.

68

Id. at 269, 309.
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greater clarity and increased understanding surrounding productions of
ESI.69
3.
Other Changes—Cost Shifting in Rule 26(c),
Reductions in Discovery under Rules 30, 31, 33, 36
[17] There were several additional changes the Committee
recommended that are grounded in the concept of proportionality. The
new cost shifting provision in Rule 26(c) is particularly noteworthy.70
While several courts have implied cost-shifting authority presently exists
in Rule 26(c) and have issued orders accordingly, the proposed changes
would eliminate any ambiguity on this issue.71 Courts would be expressly
authorized to allocate the expenses of discovery among the parties.72
[18] The Committee has also suggested reductions in the number of
depositions, interrogatories, and requests for admission.73 Under the draft
amendments, the number of depositions would be reduced from ten to
five.74 Oral deposition time would also be cut from seven hours to six.75
As for written discovery, the number of interrogatories would decrease
from twenty-five to fifteen and a numerical limit of twenty-five would be

69

See REPORT, supra note 6, at 269.

70

See generally id. at 266, 298.

71

See id.

72

See id.

73

See id. at 267-69.

74

See REPORT, supra note 6, at 267.

75

Id. at 301.
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introduced for requests for admission.76 That limit of twenty-five,
however, would not apply to requests that seek to ascertain the
genuineness of a particular document.77
C. Case Management—Rules 4, 16, 26, 34
[19] To better ensure that its objectives regarding cooperation and
proportionality are achieved, the Committee has introduced several Rules
changes that would augment the level of judicial involvement in case
management.78 Most of these changes are designed to improve the
effectiveness of the Rule 26(f) discovery conference, to encourage courts
to provide input on key discovery issues at the outset of a case, and to
expedite the commencement of discovery.79
1. Rules 26 and 34—Improving the Effectiveness of the
Rule 26(f) Discovery Conference
[20] One way the Committee felt it could enable greater judicial
involvement in case management was to require the parties to flesh out
specific issues in the Rule 26(f) conference.80 The renewed emphasis on
conducting a meaningful Rule 26(f) conference is significant as courts

76

See id. at 268-69, 305.

77

See id. at 269.

78

See id. at 260-61.

79

See REPORT, supra note 6, at 261.

80

See id. at 263.
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generally believe that a successful conference is the lynchpin for
conducting discovery in a proportional manner.81
[21] To enhance the usefulness of the conference, the Committee
recommended amending Rule 26(f) to specifically require the parties to
discuss any pertinent issues surrounding the preservation of ESI.82 This
provision is calculated to get the parties thinking proactively about
preservation problems that could arise later in discovery.83 It is also
designed to work in conjunction with the proposed amendments to Rule
16(b)(3) and Rule 37(e).84 Changes to the former would expressly
empower the court to issue a scheduling order addressing ESI preservation
issues.85 Under the latter, the extent to which preservation issues were
addressed at a discovery conference or in a scheduling order could very
well affect any subsequent motion for sanctions for failure to preserve
relevant ESI.86
[22] Another amendment to Rule 26(f) would require the parties to
discuss the need for a “clawback” order under Federal Rule of Evidence

81

See, e.g., SEVENTH CIRCUIT ELEC. DISCOVERY COMM., PRINCIPLES RELATING TO THE
DISCOVERY OF ELECTRONICALLY STORED INFORMATION, at princ. 2.05-2.06 (2010),
available at http://www.discoverypilot.com/sites/default/files/Principles8_10.pdf.
82

See REPORT, supra note 6, at 263, 295.

83

See id. at 299.

84

See id. at 263; accord id. at 287.

85

See id. at 263.

86

See id. at 299, 327-28.
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502.87 Though underused, Rule 502(d) orders generally reduce the
expense and hassle of litigating over the inadvertent disclosure of ESI
protected by the lawyer-client privilege.88 To ensure this overlooked
provision receives attention from litigants, the Committee has drafted a
corresponding amendment to Rule 16(b)(3) that would specifically enable
the court to address Rule 502(d) matters in a scheduling order.89
[23] The final step the Committee has proposed for increasing the
effectiveness of the Rule 26(f) conference is to amend Rule 26(d) and
Rule 34(b)(2) to enable parties to serve Rule 34 document requests prior to
that conference.90 These “early” requests, which are not deemed served
until the conference, are designed to “facilitate the conference by allowing
consideration of actual requests, providing a focus for specific
discussion.”91 This, the Committee hopes, will enable the parties to
subsequently prepare Rule 34 requests that are more targeted and
proportional to the issues in play.92

87

See REPORT, supra note 6 at 263, 296.

88

See John M. Barkett, Evidence Rule 502: The Solution to the Privilege-Protection
Puzzle in the Digital Era, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1589, 1619-20 (2013) (discussing the
importance of Federal Rule of Evidence 502(d) in reducing the costs and burdens
associated with attorney-client privilege reviews in discovery). See generally Richard
Marcus, The Rulemakers’ Laments, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 1639 (2013) (describing the
underuse of Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 502(d)).
89

See REPORT, supra note 6, at 263, 286.

90

See id. at 263-64, 294, 298, 306, 308.

91

Id. at 263-64.

92

See id. at 264.
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2. Rule 16—Greater Judicial Input on Key Discovery
Issues
[24] As mentioned above, the Committee has suggested adding
provisions to Rule 16(b)(3) that track those in Rule 26(f) so as to provide
the opportunity for greater judicial input on certain e-Discovery issues at
the outset of a case.93 In addition to these changes, Rule 16(b)(3) would
also allow a court to require that the parties caucus with the court before
filing a discovery motion.94 The purpose of this provision is to encourage
the disposition of these matters without the expense or delay of motion
practice.95 According to the Committee, various courts have used similar
arrangements under their local rules that have “prove[n] highly effective in
reducing cost and delay.”96
3. Rules 4 and 16—Expediting the Commencement of
Discovery
[25] The Committee has also recommended the time for the
commencement of discovery be shortened after the filing of the complaint
so as to expedite the eventual disposition of a given case.97 In particular,
Rule 4(m) would be revised to shorten time to serve the summons and
complaint from 120 days to sixty days.98 In addition, the Rule 16(b)(2)
93

See id. at 263.

94

See REPORT, supra note 6, at 263, 288.

95

See id. at 263, 288.

96

Id. at 263.

97

See id. at 261, 282, 284-85, 287

98

Id. at 261, 282.
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amendment would reduce by thirty days the time when a court must issue
a scheduling order.99
D. Preservation and Sanctions under a Revised Federal Rule
37(e)
[26] The Committee has separately considered issues regarding the
over-preservation of evidence and the appropriate standard of culpability
required to impose sanctions for any failures to preserve relevant
information.100 Even though the current iteration of Rule 37(e) is
supposed to provide guidance on these issues, amendments were deemed
necessary given the inherent limitations with the Rule.101
[27] As it now stands, Rule 37(e) is designed to protect litigants from
court sanctions when the good faith, programmed operation of their
computer systems automatically destroys ESI.102 Nevertheless, the Rule
has largely proved ineffective as a national standard because it does not
apply to pre-litigation information destruction activities.103 As a result,
courts often used their inherent authority to bypass the Rule’s protections
and punish clients that negligently, though not nefariously, destroyed
99

REPORT, supra note 6, at 261, 284-85.

100

See id. at 271-72.

101

See id. at 272, 274.

102

FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e). See generally Philip J. Favro, Sea Change or Status Quo: Has
the Rule 37(e) Safe Harbor Advanced Best Practices for Information Management?, 11
MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 317 (2010) (discussing the background, purposes, and
application of Rule 37(e)).

103

See Paul W. Grimm et al., Proportionality in the Post-Hoc Analysis of Pre-Litigation
Preservation Decisions, 37 U. BALT. L. REV. 381, 398 (2008).
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documents before a lawsuit was filed.104 Moreover, the Rule applied only
to ESI and did not address issues surrounding the preservation of paper
documents or other forms of evidence.105 All of which has caused
confusion among parties over what needs to be maintained for litigation,
resulting in the over-preservation of information.106
[28] The amendments to Rule 37(e) are designed to address these issues
by “provid[ing] a uniform standard in federal court for sanctions for
failure to preserve.”107 They do so by removing the possibility that courts
could impose the so-called doomsday sanctions from Rule 37(b)(2)(A) for
either negligent or grossly negligent conduct in connection with
preservation obligations.108 Instead, the proposal would shield prelitigation destruction of information from sanctions except where “the
party’s actions” resulted in either of the following: “(i) caused substantial
prejudice in the litigation and were willful or in bad faith; or (ii)
irreparably deprived a party of any meaningful opportunity to present or
defend against the claims in the litigation.”109

104

See REPORT, supra note 6, at 272 (noting that the proposed amendments reject a
standard that holds negligence to be sufficient for sanctions, such as the one used in
Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Financial Corp., 306 F.3d 99 (2d Cir. 2002)).

105

See id. at 274.

106

See id. at 317-18.

107

Id. at 321; see id. at 318.

108

See id. at 272, 321.

109

REPORT, supra note 6, at 315.
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[29] In making a determination on this issue, courts would no longer
just rely on their inherent powers.110 Instead, they would employ a
multifaceted analysis to examine the nature and motives underlying the
party’s information retention decisions.111 Such factors include:
(A) the extent to which the party was on notice that
litigation was likely and that the information would be
discoverable;
(B) the reasonableness of the party’s efforts to preserve the
information;
(C) whether the party received a request to preserve
information, whether the request was clear and reasonable,
and whether the person who made it and the party
consulted in good faith about the scope of preservation;
(D) the proportionality of the preservation efforts to any
anticipated or ongoing litigation; and
(E) whether the party timely sought the court’s guidance on
any unresolved disputes about preserving discoverable
information.112
[30] By ensuring the analysis includes a broad range of considerations,
the proposed Rule appears to delineate a balanced approach to
preservation questions.113 Such an approach may very well benefit
organizations, which could justify a reasonable document retention

110

See id. at 320.

111

See id. at 325-28.

112

Id. at 316-17.

113

See id. at 325-28.
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strategy on best corporate practices for defensible deletion.114 The
Committee contemplates as much, observing that “[t]his subdivision
[proposed Rule 37 (e)(1)(B)(i)] protects a party that has made reasonable
preservation decisions in light of the factors identified in Rule 37(e)(2),
which emphasize both reasonableness and proportionality.”115
[31] While the draft amendments to Rule 37(e) provide some key
protections for enterprises, the proposed Rule also addresses some of the
lingering concerns from the plaintiffs’ bar.116 For example, the Rule
specifically empowers the court to order “additional discovery” or other
“curative measures” when a litigant has destroyed information that it
should have retained for litigation.117 Under these provisions, an aggrieved
party can ferret out the circumstances surrounding the destruction of that
data.118 If the party uncovers evidence suggesting the destruction was
sufficiently grievous, it could ultimately justify the imposition of sanctions
under either of the above tests.119
E. The Instant Rules Proposals Will Impact Organizations
[32] To be sure, the amendments the Committee has proposed will have
a direct impact on organizations. For example, the draft revisions to Rule
37(e) clearly emphasize the need for companies to develop reasonable
114

Kozubek, supra note 17.

115

REPORT, supra note 6, at 321.

116

See id. at 314-15, 320-21.

117

Id. at 314-15.

118

See id. at 320-21.

119

See id. at 320-23, 325-28.
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information retention policies, along with a workable litigation hold
procedure.120 The enterprise that does so could simultaneously eliminate
large amounts of information and reduce its discovery costs and legal
exposure.121
[33] Another effect of the proposed changes is that they will force
companies to address discovery matters on an expedited timeframe.122
The truncated time periods for the service of a complaint and the issuance
of a scheduling order mean parties would have less time to prepare for the
commencement of discovery.123
[34] In addition, the proposals spotlight the need for litigants to be
prepared to address substantive discovery issues early in the case. This is
evidenced by the draft requirement that litigants discuss ESI preservation
and Rule 502(d) orders at the Rule 26(f) conference and the Rule 16(b)
scheduling conference.124 The proposed advent of early Rule 34
document requests is also exemplary of this substantive discovery issue as
it would require litigants to more thoroughly vet discovery issues at the

120

Cf. Dembin & Favro, supra note 1 (suggesting some steps that in-house lawyers can
take on behalf of their organizational clients to change the manner in which discovery is
conducted).
121

See id.; see also supra Part II.D.

122

REPORT, supra note 6, at 261 (“The case-management proposals reflect a perception
that the early stages of litigation often take far too long. ‘Time is money.’ The longer it
takes to litigate an action, the more it costs. And delay is itself undesirable.”).
123

See supra Part II.C.3.

124

See supra Part II.C.1-2.
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Rule 26(f) conference.125 The elimination of open-ended, rolling
document productions under a revised Rule 34(b)(2)(B) also underscores
the need for better discovery preparations and expedited compliance.126
[35] The proportionality changes to Rule 26(b)(1) will also impact
organizations.127 Companies seeking to stave off overly broad requests
will need to better understand the nature of their relevant data if they are to
articulate with the necessary precision the burdens associated with
production.128
Otherwise, disproportionate production orders will
continue to be issued.129 In contrast, companies that have a grasp of their
relevant information stand a greater chance of making the case to narrow
the scope of the requests or having the costs of discovery shifted under the
proposed amendment to Rule 26(c).130
[36] In summary, there should be little dispute that the proposed
amendments will affect litigants. The question for organizations,
125

See supra Part II.C.1.

126

See supra Part II.B.2.

127

See supra Part II.B.1.

128

See generally Pippins v. KPMG LLP, No. 11 Civ. 0377(CM)(JLC), 2011 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 116427, at *23-27 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 7, 2011), aff’d, 279 F.R.D. 245 (S.D.N.Y.
2012) (discussing proportionality standards).
129

See id.

130

See supra Part II.B.3. See generally Eisai Inc. v. Sanofi-Aventis U.S., LLC, No. 084168 (MLC), 2012 US. Dist. LEXIS 52885 (D.N.J. Apr. 16, 2012) (invoking
proportionality standards to deny substantially all of the plaintiff’s document requests).
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however, is whether they will take the necessary measures to improve
their information governance so they are prepared for the Rules changes
once they are enacted.
III. PRACTICAL SUGGESTIONS FOR MEETING THE INFORMATION
GOVERNANCE CHALLENGES POSED BY THE DRAFT RULES CHANGES
[37] If enterprises expect to address the likely effects of the proposed
Rules amendments, they will need to take proactive steps to ensure they
can do so.131 While there are no quick or easy solutions to these problems,
an increasingly popular method for effectively dealing with them is
through an organizational strategy referred to as information
governance.132 At its core, information governance is a comprehensive
approach that companies adopt to satisfy the challenges associated with
information retention, data security, privacy, and e-Discovery.133
Organizations that have done so have been successful in addressing the
costs and risks associated with these formerly distinct disciplines.134

131

See Charles R. Ragan, Information Governance: It’s a Duty and It’s Smart Business,
19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 12, ¶ 9 (2013), http://jolt.richmond.edu/v19i4/article12.pdf; Dean
Gonsowski, Inside Experts: Information Governance Takes the Stage in 2012, INSIDE
COUNSEL (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.insidecounsel.com/2012/01/27/inside-expertsinformation-governance-takes-the-st.
132

See Ragan, supra note 131, at ¶¶30-33.

133

See Gonsowski, supra note 131.

134

See, e.g., E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., No. 3:09cv58, 2011
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 45888, at *46-48 (E.D. Va. Apr. 27, 2011) (holding that sanctions were
not appropriate where emails were eliminated pursuant to a good faith information
retention policy before a duty to preserve attached).
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[38] While there are many steps that enterprises can take to implement
an effective information governance program, the five that I discuss in this
Part are essential for those companies seeking to satisfy the draft Rules
changes and thereby decrease the costs and delays associated with the
discovery process. They include developing reasonable information
retention policies; preparing an effective litigation hold process; creating
policies governing employee mobile device use; deploying technologies
for ESI collection, search, and review; and developing a more coordinated
and better managed relationship with outside counsel. I consider each of
these steps in turn.
A. Develop Reasonable Information Retention Policies
[39] If a company is really intent on obtaining more cost-effective
results in discovery under the proposed Rules, it should examine its
The time to conduct this
strategy for information retention.135
examination is not in the crisis atmosphere of complex litigation.136
Instead, it should be part of the business plan for the organization.137
Effective information retention requires each business unit to identify the
records that it creates, why it creates them, whether to retain them and for
how long, who gets access to these records, and where the records are
stored.138 The organization that can easily determine whether relevant
135

See Anne Kershaw, Proposed New Federal Civil Rules—Part One (Data Disposition
& Sanctions), EXCHANGE (ARMA Metro NYC, New York, N.Y.), Nov.–Dec. 2013, at
10, 13, http://www.armanyc.org/files/Nov-Dec%202013%20FINAL.pdf (opining that
“organizations will have every reason to make sure that they routinely dispose of
documents that do not need to be retained” if the proposed changes to Rule 37(e) are
enacted).
136

See Ragan, supra note 131, at ¶¶ 42-43.

137

See id.

138

See id.
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records exist and where they should be located will clearly be ahead when
litigation inevitably arises.139
[40] This, in turn, should lead to the development of top-down
information retention policies.140 Enterprises can hardly hope to decrease
their discovery spending if their retention policies are antiquated,
inadequate, or arbitrarily observed.141 Indeed, the casebooks are replete
with examples of companies whose discovery costs skyrocketed because
they failed to properly manage their data with reasonable retention
protocols.142
The case of Northington v. H&M International is
particularly instructive on this issue.143
[41] In Northington, the court issued an adverse inference instruction to
address the defendant company’s destruction of key e-mails and other
ESI.144 The company failed to preserve those records because it did not

139

See Brigham Young Univ. v. Pfizer, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 566, 572-73 (D. Utah 2012)
(denying plaintiffs’ fourth motion for doomsday sanctions since evidence was destroyed
pursuant to defendants’ “good faith business procedures”).
140

See Gonsowski, supra note 131.

141

See Doe v. Norwalk Cmty. Coll., 248 F.R.D. 372, 378 (D. Conn. 2007) (denying
defendants’ request to invoke the so-called “safe harbor” provision under Rule 37(e)
where the defendants failed to observe their own document retention policies).

142

See, e.g., United Med. Supply Co. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 274 (2007)
(sanctioning defendant for allowing materials to be destroyed by its “antiquated”
retention policies); Doe, 248 F.R.D. at 378.

143

Northington v. H&M Int’l, No. 08-CV-6297, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14366, at *43,
*45-46 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 12, 2011).
144

Id. at *58-61.
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think to implement a pre-litigation information retention strategy.145 For
example, the company neglected to establish a formal document retention
policy.146 Instead, “data retention . . . was evidently handled on an ad hoc,
case-by-case basis.”147 This lack of organization eventually led to the loss
of key data, costly motion practice, and the court’s sanctions award.148
[42] To avoid these negative consequences, companies should insist
that their in-house counsel work with IT professionals, records managers,
and business units to jointly decide what data must be kept and for what
length of time.149 By so doing, companies can spearhead the development
of retention policies that are reasonable in relation to the enterprise’s
business needs and its litigation profile.150 This should eventually lead to
the systematic elimination of useless, superfluous, and/or harmful data in
an organized and reasonable fashion.151 If performed in this manner, it is
unlikely that such document destruction would be viewed as spoliation
under the draft revisions to Rule 37(e) or much of the existing case law on
this issue.152
145

See id. at *22-25.

146

Id. at *21.

147

Id.

148

Northington, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14366, at *16-19, *21.

149

See Gonsowski, supra note 131.

150

See id.

151

See Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 645 F.3d 1311, 1322 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(approving information retention policies that eliminate documents for “good
housekeeping” purposes); Gonsowski, supra note 131.
152

See, e.g., Viramontes v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 10 C 761, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7850, at
*8, *10-13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2011) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)) (denying sanctions
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B. Prepare an Effective Litigation Hold Process
[43] If information retention policies are to be effective for purposes of
the draft revisions to Rule 37(e), they must be accompanied by a workable
litigation hold process.153 Without a workable approach to litigation
holds, the entire discovery process may very well collapse.154 For
documents to be produced in litigation, they must first be preserved.155
Documents cannot be preserved if the key players or data source
custodians are unaware that they must be retained.156 Indeed, employees
and data sources may discard or overwrite ESI if they are oblivious to a
preservation duty.157 This would leave organizations vulnerable to data
loss and court sanctions, regardless of the proposed changes to Rule
37(e).158 No recent case is more instructive on this than E.I. du Pont de
Nemours v. Kolon Industries.159
motion since the emails at issue were eliminated pursuant to a good faith retention policy
before a duty to preserve was triggered).
153

See, e.g., id. at *8-10, *12-13 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(e)).

154

See, e.g., E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 803 F. Supp. 2d 469,
509-10 (E.D. Va. 2011) (issuing an adverse inference jury instruction as a result of the
defendant’s failure to distribute a timely and comprehensive litigation hold after its
obligation ripened to retain relevant ESI).
155

See, e.g., id. at 508-09.

156

See, e.g., id. at 507-09.

157

See Oleksy v. General Elec. Co., No. 06 C 1245, 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107638, at
*33-35 (N.D. Ill. July 31, 2013) (ordering the production of defendant’s litigation hold
instructions as a discovery sanction for failing to preserve relevant evidence that was
purged from a database).
158

See Micron Tech., Inc. v. Rambus Inc., 917 F. Supp. 2d 300, 316, 327 (D. Del. 2013)
(declaring defendant’s patents unenforceable as a discovery sanction to address its failure
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[44] In Du Pont, the court issued a stiff rebuke against defendant Kolon
Industries for failing to issue a timely and proper litigation hold.160 That
rebuke came in the form of an instruction to the jury that Kolon executives
and employees deleted key evidence after the company’s preservation
duty was triggered.161 The jury responded by returning a $919 million
verdict in favor of DuPont.162
[45] The destruction at issue occurred when Kolon deleted e-mails and
other records relevant to DuPont’s trade secret claims.163 After being
apprised of the lawsuit and then receiving multiple litigation hold notices,
various Kolon executives and employees met together and identified ESI
that should be deleted.164 The ensuing data destruction was staggering:

to preserve email backup tapes, paper documents and other ESI). But see Brigham
Young Univ. v. Pfizer, Inc., 282 F.R.D. 566, 572-73 (D. Utah 2012) (denying plaintiffs’
fourth motion for doomsday sanctions since evidence was destroyed pursuant to
defendants’ “good faith business procedures”).
159

See Du Pont, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 510.

160

Id. at 501-02, 509-10.

161

Id. at 509-10.

162

E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co. v. Kolon Indus., Inc., 894 F. Supp. 2d 691, 721 (E.D.
Va. 2012) (entering a 20-year product injunction against the defendant); Press Release,
McGuire Woods, Jury Returns $919 Million for DuPont in Trade Secrets Theft Case
(Sept. 15, 2011), available at http://mcguirewoods.com/News/PressReleases/2011/9/Jury-Returns-$919-Million-for-DuPont-in-Trade-Secrets-TheftCase.aspx.
163

Du Pont, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 478-82.

164

Id. at 478, 480-82, 501-05.
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nearly 18,000 files and e-mails were destroyed.165 Furthermore, many of
these materials went right to the heart of DuPont’s claim that key aspects
of its Kevlar formula were allegedly misappropriated to improve Kolon’s
competing product line.166
[46] Surprisingly, however, the court did not blame Kolon’s employees
as the principal culprits for spoliation.167 Instead, the court criticized the
company’s attorneys and executives, reasoning they could have prevented
the destruction of information through an effective litigation hold
process.168 This was because the three hold notices circulated to the key
players and data sources were either too limited in their distribution,
ineffective since they were prepared in English for Korean-speaking
employees, or were too late to prevent or otherwise alleviate the
spoliation.169
[47] The Du Pont case underscores the importance of developing a
workable litigation hold process as part of the company’s overall
information governance plan.170 As Du Pont teaches, organizations
should identify what key players and data sources may have relevant
information.171 Designated officials who are responsible for preparing the
165

Id. at 480.

166

Id. at 480, 482, 489.

167

Id. at 501.

168

Du Pont, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 501 (holding that Kolon’s “counsel and executives should
have affirmatively monitored compliance with the [litigation hold] orders.”).

169

Id. at 479, 494.

170

See generally id.

171

See id. at 500.
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hold should then draft the hold instructions in an intelligible fashion.172
Finally, the hold should be circulated immediately to prevent data loss.173
It is only by following these suggestions that organizations can ensure that
information subject to a preservation duty is actually retained and thereby
avoid sanctions under the proposed amendments to Rule 37(e).174
C. Create Policies Governing Mobile Device Use
[48] Another aspect of information governance that can help companies
address the impact of the Rules proposals is the development of policies
governing the use of mobile devices.175 These devices—especially
smartphones and tablet computers—are at the forefront of digital age
innovations affecting businesses today.176 While these mobile devices
172

See id.

173

See Du Pont, 803 F. Supp. 2d at 500.

174

See, e.g., Viramontes v. U.S. Bancorp, No. 10 C 761, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7850, at
*12-13 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 27, 2011) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 37(a)(5)(B)) (denying sanctions
motion since defendant issued a timely litigation hold to preserve relevant documents
once a preservation duty attached).
175

See PHILIP BERKOWITZ ET AL., LITTLER REPORT, THE “BRING YOUR OWN DEVICE” TO
WORK MOVEMENT: ENGINEERING PRACTICAL EMPLOYMENT AND LABOR LAW
COMPLIANCE SOLUTIONS 1, 45 (2012), available at
http://www.littler.com/files/press/pdf/TheLittlerReportTheBringYourOwnDeviceToWorkMovement.pdf (detailing legal challenges regarding
mobile device use such as implementing legal holds, protecting trade secrets, and proving
misappropriation).
176

See Greg Day, Overview from Greg Day On the Topic of Bring Your Own Device—
The Challenges Facing Today and How This Trend Will Evolve in the Future, SYMANTEC
(Apr. 23, 2012), http://www.symantec.com/tv/news/details.jsp?vid=1555866669001
(describing the various challenges associated with mobile devices in the workplace).
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have revolutionized the way in which business is conducted, they have
also introduced a myriad of security, privacy, and e-Discovery
complications for enterprises.177
[49] In particular, mobile device use lessens the extent of corporate
control over confidential business information.178
Whether that
information consists of trade secrets, proprietary financial data, or
attorney-client privileged communications, mobile devices allow
employees to more easily disclose and misappropriate that information
than they otherwise could have with traditional computer hardware.179
With a single touch of a smartphone screen, an employee can direct
sensitive company data to personal cloud providers, social networking
sites, or Wikileaks pages.180 Any of these scenarios could prove
disastrous for an organization.181

177

See BERKOWITZ, supra note 175, at 10.

178

See Henry Z. Horbaczewski & Ronald I. Raether, BYOD: Know the Privacy and
Security Issues Before Inviting Employee-Owned Devices to the Party, ACC DOCKET,
Apr. 2012, at 71, 72, available at http://www.ficlaw.com/Links/raether/Rir_byod.pdf
(“Security starts with knowing what data resides where, and who has access to that data.
With employee-owned devices, the main unique issue from a security perspective is loss
of control.”).
179

See id.

180

See Lisa Milam-Perez, Littler Mendelson Attorney Warns of Pitfalls of “BYOD”,
WOLTERS KLUWER (July 29, 2012),
http://www.employmentlawdaily.com/index.php/2012/07/29/littler-mendelson-attorneywarns-of-pitfalls-of-byod/ (describing best practices for workplace policies regarding
mobile device use: “No use by friends and family members! ‘I got the most guff for this
one . . . and I imagine you probably will too. I know your kid likes to play Angry Birds,
and I know you bought it with your own money,’ but it’s an essential control”); Privacy
Roundtable Highlights, RECORDER (Mar. 5, 2013),
http://www.law.com/jsp/ca/PubArticleCA.jsp?id=1202591017099 (discussing the risk of
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[50] Furthermore, an enterprise has the challenge of preserving and
producing information maintained on a mobile device.182 The logistical
challenges of locating, retaining, and turning over that data—all while
trying to observe employee privacy—present complications for satisfying
the proposed Rules amendments, among many other things.183
[51] To address these and other problems associated with these devices,
organizations will need to develop workable use policies.184 Such policies
will need to address how employees should handle company data on
mobile devices, regardless of whether those devices are work-issued or
whether they belong to the employee.185 They should also delineate the
nature and extent of the enterprise’s right to access data on the employee
misappropriation of company data by family members sharing devices that may also be
used for work under an employer’s mobile device policy).
181

See Milam-Perez, supra note 180 (discussing the “potential liability and other risks”
of bring your own device policies).
182

See Ragan, supra note 131, at ¶ 16 (noting that companies must keep certain
information for various time periods and the effect of new technologies on information
retention).
183

See id; see also Greg Buckles, A Quick Forensics Lesson: The Smart Phone Is Much
More Than Just a Hard Drive, LEGAL IT PROFS. (July 17, 2012),
http://www.legalitprofessionals.com/legal-it-columns/guest-columns/4471-a-quickforensics-lesson-the-smart-phone-is-much-more-than-just-a-hard-drive (describing
various challenges surrounding the preservation and collection of ESI from mobile
devices).
184

See Susan Ross, Unintended Consequences of Bring Your Own Device, LAW TECH.
NEWS, Mar. 7, 2013, at 3, available at
http://www.law.com/jsp/lawtechnologynews/PubArticleLTN.jsp?id=1202591156823&th
epage=1.
185

See Milam-Perez, supra note 180; Privacy Roundtable Highlights, supra note 180.
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device, particularly for discovery purposes.186 To address inevitable
privacy concerns that arise when trolling through an employee device for
discoverable data, technologies could be downloaded on to that device to
segregate and encrypt company information from personal materials.187
Such a measure would also help prevent an employee’s family or friends
from accessing confidential ESI.188
[52] Another best practice for enabling more rapid preservation and
production of mobile device ESI is to eliminate any notion that the
employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the device.189 While
this can likely be done by policy for work-issued devices, it should
probably be secured by separate agreement from an employee who is
using a personal device under a “bring your own device” policy.190 The
organization that has an unfettered right to obtain relevant ESI from a
mobile device will more likely satisfy the preservation, proportionality,
and accelerated compliance expectations of the proposed Rules
amendments.191

186

See Day, supra note 176.

187

See Philip J. Favro, Inviting Scrutiny: How Technologies are Eroding the AttorneyClient Privilege, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2, ¶ 158 (2013),
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v20i1/article2.pdf.
188

Id.

189

See, e.g., Michael Z. Green, Against Employer Dumpster-Diving for Email, 64 S.C. L.
REV. 323, 341 (2012).
190

See id. at 341, 362-63.

191

See generally Howard Hunter, Social Media and Discovery, 24 N.Y. ST. B. ASS’N
INT'L L. PRACTICUM 117, 117, 119-21 (2011) (describing the interplay between privacy
strictures and discovery obligations).
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D. Deploy Technologies for ESI Collection, Search, and
Review
[53] Just as technology can facilitate compliance with company mobile
device policies, ESI collection, search, and review technologies can help
companies satisfy the expedited discovery objectives of the Rules
proposals.192 This undoubtedly includes cutting edge innovations such as
predictive coding and visualization tools.193
[54] Predictive coding employs machine-learning technology to more
readily pinpoint relevant ESI than would be possible for human
reviewers.194 If properly utilized, predictive coding can also reduce the
staff required to conduct document reviews.195 On the other hand,
visualization tools use analytics and machine learning to provide
companies with a better understanding of the nature of their relevant
information.196 This allows for the detection of trends, relationships, and

192

See Patrick J. Walsh, Rethinking Civil Litigation in Federal District Court, 40 NO. 1
LITIG. 6, 6-7 (2013).
193

See id. at 7 (“A better method for searching large databases is predictive coding.”).

194

See Moore v. Publicis Groupe, 287 F.R.D. 182, 190 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (detailing the
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patterns within the universe of that information; all of which can expedite
the search and review process.197
[55] Enterprises would also be well served to familiarize themselves
with traditional e-Discovery technology tools such as keyword search,
concept search, email threading, and data clustering.198 With respect to
keyword searches, there is significant confusion regarding their continued
viability given some prominent court opinions frowning on so-called blind
keyword searches.199 However, most e-Discovery jurisprudence and
authoritative commentators confirm the effectiveness of certain keyword
searches so far as they involve some combination of testing, sampling and
iterative feedback.200
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See Jacob Tingen, Technologies-That-Must-Not-Be-Named: Understanding and
Implementing Advanced Search Technologies in E-Discovery, 19 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 2,
¶¶ 1-2, 43 (2012), http://jolt.richmond.edu/index.php/407/ (explaining the benefits of
using visualization tools in discovery over traditional review methods).
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[56] Regardless of the tools that a litigant selects for collection, search,
and review, some form of technology is ultimately necessary to meet the
proposed Rules changes. It is not difficult to envision the problems that
companies will have litigating under the revised Rules without using some
combination of these tools.201 For example, enterprises will find it
difficult to intelligently discuss discovery matters at the Rule 26(f)
conference or the Rule 16(b) scheduling conference. Nor will they be able
to establish—much less meet—good faith production deadlines required
by proposed Rule 34(b)(2)(B). While various other scenarios similar to
these abound, it is sufficient to observe that e-Discovery in 2014 and
beyond will require help from technology.202
E. Better Management of Outside Counsel
[57] A final measure that companies should consider is developing a
more carefully managed relationship with their retained outside counsel.203
More of an outgrowth of information governance, such a well-managed
relationship has the potential to keep client discovery costs more

prepared to explain the rationale for the method chosen to the court, demonstrate that it is
appropriate for the task, and show that it was properly implemented.”).
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is Required of In-house Counsel in eDiscovery, ACC DOCKET, May 2013, at 82, 89
(describing some of the ways that in-house counsel can obtain better advocacy from its
retained outside counsel).
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reasonable while guiding counsel to litigate within the bounds of the
proposed Rules changes.204
[58] The first step that companies can take in this regard is to state their
expectations for how discovery should be conducted at the time of
retention or at the commencement of a suit.205 A realistic budget and
staffing, considering those expectations, must be addressed.206 Companies
should also emphasize to their engaged lawyers the importance of
satisfying the requirements of the proposed Rules, particularly
proportionality standards.207 While these requirements may be overlooked
or even unknown to many attorneys, clients are bound—under penalty of
sanctions—to ensure that their discovery efforts meet these standards.208
Moreover, company efforts to insist on proportional discovery may be
rewarded with decreased preservation and collection costs.209
[59] It is also crucial that organizations communicate with their outside
lawyers regarding pertinent aspects of their information governance
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plan.210 To decrease the possibility for misunderstandings, companies
should provide ready access to appropriate information technology
personnel and relevant business leaders (the owners of the relevant
information) to outside counsel.211 Outside counsel cannot be effective—
and may inadvertently stumble into a costly e-Discovery sideshow—if
they are unfamiliar with the company’s information governance and
retention policies.212 In contrast, having such information will enable
outside counsel to more easily negotiate key issues surrounding the
discovery of ESI at the Rule 26(f) conference and Rule 16(b) scheduling
conference.213 Moreover, open communication regarding this matter will
facilitate strategy and logistics regarding the preservation and collection of
relevant information.214
[60] By taking these steps, organizations will increase their likelihood
of compliance with the Rules proposals. In addition, having such an
organized strategy and partnership will reduce discovery delays and
related legal fees that typically result from poor planning.215
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CONCLUSION

[61] Compliance with the proposed Rules amendments does not need to
be an elusive concept. Organizations can prepare for the Rules
amendments by taking the initiative to implement or update their
information governance strategy. By following the suggestions that I
delineate in this Article, along with other best practices, enterprises can
satisfy the new requirements under the draft Rules revisions. In so doing,
they will likely reduce the costs and burdens associated with discovery—
both now and in the future.
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